Written by Laurence Brahm - Published by Review Asia on 01/01/2008

The Afghans may have cheered when the Americans came rolling in promising democracy, but now they are angry with the warlords who have been placed in power Laurence Brahm.

Afghanistan stands today as a monument to the failings of Washington Consensus political and economic development modules when they are imposed like some off-the-rack item on other nations and cultures, where they simply do not fit.

“We have internalized the entire Washington Consensus. People are not thinking. They do not ask questions, and accept things at face value. But in the meantime, local people’s way of life is threatened. So they will fight back,” says Jiang Xueqin, a Canadian documentary filmmaker, who wanted to witness the rebuilding of Afghanistan.

Following the invasion of Afghanistan by a US-led coalition in 2001, Jiang joined the United Nations Assistant Mission in Afghanistan (Unama) as a public information officer. The mission serves as a coordinating umbrella for all UN operations in Afghanistan, which to date have been guided by the US military. The experience gave Jiang an eye-opening course in Washington Consensus developmental economics, and its role in dismantling rather than building nations.

Jiang recalls attending a United Nations Development Program (UNDP) seminar in 2006, where some 20 PhD-armed “experts” brainstormed programs on how to build a government. Fancy PowerPoint presentations illustrated a highly centralized version of a so-called federal model. In the middle of the proceedings, Jiang interrupted: “The problem with your model is that [Afghan] President [Hamid] Karzai is Pashtun. There are three other ethnic groups that all hate each other. So how can you impose the authority of one ethnic group on all the others?”

The experts explained their approach. “We know Afghanistan has ethnic and religions divisions and religious extremist differences. But if we factor all the problems in, then there is no solution. So the only way forward is to adopt a federal solution, using an artificial module based on presumed assumptions which require factoring out all the problems.”

That same year, rioting broke out in Kabul, the capital. It began when a US convoy of Humvees sped through the city, smashing into several local cars, killing people. The convoy was immediately surrounded by angry Kabul citizens. In a panic, American soldiers started shooting. Karzai made no public attempt to quell exploding tensions. Chaos ensued. As rioting spun out of control, guest houses of foreign aid experts and executing agencies were pillaged.

Now, why would Afghans attack foreign aid agencies and experts who theoretically should be helping them?

Truthfully, most Afghans cannot differentiate between aid workers from non-government organizations (NGOs) and military personnel. This is not their fault. Lines between both have been severely blurred in Kabul.

A lot of aid for Afghanistan has been funded in cooperation with US military either directly or at least through entities identified with the US military or intelligence community. Much aid is being pushed towards the sensitive and porous Pakistan border, where American military faces its biggest resistance. At least that is how Afghans see it.

Less covertly, US military personnel have been reportedly overseeing and even directing aid work in Afghanistan. Little wonder Afghans cannot differentiate between aid programs that might be intended to help improve lives and what many Afghans interpret as their own colonization, or at least administration, by a president backed by foreign military.

The coalition military forces come from the same aid donor nations, mainly US and Britain, with token representatives from Germany, France, Japan and Italy. Controlling the purse strings, they set agendas. Unsurprisingly, the NGOs and implementing agencies are from these countries as well. So the NGOs are there because of the donors.

In a way, foreign aid is a business. It is an industry like anything else. There are many links in the aid-feeding chain and funds that are usually siphoned off at each level. As a result, very little money actually gets to the locals. With too much overhead, to many moths to feed, and minimal supervision of aid agencies, there are lots of temptations to loot.

Since 2001, the USAgency for International Development (USAID) has pumped US$8 billion into Afghanistan. The agency is an arm of the US State Department known for accessing sensitive areas where intelligence is sought. Many suspect if of having a dual mission, one of them covertly.

Strategic objectives cannot be discounted as consideration for USAID. For instance, its regulatory practice requires funding only to US contractors. Companies like Halliburton – formerly run by US Vice-President Dick Cheney – and construction conglomerates like Louis Berger get the turnkey contracts. Locals cannot benefit directly, except at the end of this feeding chain. The main contractor usually takes 40% off the top of the contract price before subcontracting down the chain to so-called experts.

A lot of foreigners working in Afghanistan without knowledge of local problems, culture and language, are the designated “experts.” The thousands of foreign experts, with an average salary of US$200,000 a year, have brought with their “expertise” an economic byproduct – inflation. This has hurt locals the most, heightening resentment towards the government, which they perceive as supported – and manipulated – by foreign aid.

“I feel very strongly that we – the international community – are not helping the Afghans,” says Jiang. “We are making the country a lot worse. We are making it more likely that genocide will occur [soon] after we leave their country and the four major ethnic groups – Pashtun, Uzbek, Tajik and Hazara – will begin to really fight each other. In the long run, this will come back and haunt us.”

Washington policy advisers arrive with pre-conceived blinkered perspectives not in tune with the realities of a multi-ethnic society. “The Americans will have trouble succeeding in Afghanistan because they are blind to ethnic rivalries,” says Jiang.

Many of Afghanistan’s problems stem from its history as an artificial country partitioned during the Great Game, a compromise between Russia and Great Britain creating a buffer zone for Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Pakistan and Iran, and incorporating ethnic groups from each country. Traditionally, these groups vied for and warred over the most precious resources in Afghanistan’s badland desert – water.

Eighty years ago, the now dominant Pashtuns entered northern Afghanistan, claiming fertile valleys comprising the strategic source of the Balkh River. They displaced Tajiks, Hazaras and the Turkmen, tearing up their water-use treaties. Today, Pashtun commanders dam the river and re-route streams to expand their farmland, most of it planted to opium. According to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime, opium production in Balkh province increased by 300% in one year.

Historically, nearly every attempting conqueror – from Alexander the Great to Genghis Kahn, from the Moguls to the British and Russians – recognized these inherent rivalries and attempted to rule by pitching one group against the other.

Then the Americans arrived, with a different idea. Ignoring traditional rivalries, the Washington Consensus approach was adopted. A federal model of democracy was selected for Afghanistan. In a very politically correct move, American advisers called for a “rainbow coalition” across sensitive tribal cultures fraught with regional factionalism.

Today, armed to the teeth, representatives of ethnic groups hold various portfolios in government. Sworn enemies across the generations they find it difficult to cooperate within the “rainbow coalition.” Even in a single ministry, officers and workers from various tries cannot communicate with another.

“To work in development, the first thing one must understand is local people, local problems – and giving local people ownership over the problem,” says Jiang. “If you just go in and override people’s cultural prejudices, they will turn against you. It all comes down to local ownership. You must entrust people to have their own system of government and then run it. You cannot force a system on people who do not want it.”

This happened during the introduction of so-called democracy in Afghanistan. Long-despised warlords – brought back by America to replace the Taleban – obtained power through fraud and thug abuse during parliamentary elections. UN monitoring teams noted popular outrage. But the White House wanted none of this. So UN observers had a choice – please Uncle Sam or stand up for the Afghans, half elections and restructure procedures along local culture. UN observers chose the latter by rapidly concluding elections.

From that day on, most Afghans started questioning the Western democratic political process. Today, 80% of Afghanistan’s parliament comprise of local warlords, many of them previously overthrown by the Taleban. The common people continue to suffer.

The US-led coalition continues to support local warlords because they protect its interests. Ironically, emotions have come full circle. Many Afghans are now nostalgic for the Taleban days, when order was maintained and Kabul was safe at night.

Obviously, people hold democracy as well as free and fair elections as universal values. But this has become Afghan’s irony.

“Afghans believed in American democracy, and cheered when the Americans rolled in,” Jiang says. “So they got angry when America promised them free and fair elections and gave them back warlords. Afghans want a proper accounting of history. They want these warlords to go to jail – not to represent them in parliament.

Laurence Brahm is a global activist, international mediator, political columnist and author. He is the leading advocate of a fresh development paradigm - The Himalayan Consensus - an innovative approach to development.

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